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Abstract 
For a large number of companies from different countries, we analyze how company 
corporate governance practices and country regulatory regimes interact in terms of 
company valuation. We confirm that corporate governance plays a crucial role in 
efficient company monitoring and shareholder protection, and consequently positively 
impacts valuation. We find substitution in valuation impact between corporate 
governance measures at the company and country level, with a possibility of over-
regulation.  Corporate governance appears also more valuable for companies that rely 
heavily on external financing, consistent with the hypothesis that corporate 
governance main role is to protect external financiers.  
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1. Introduction  
In this paper, we explore the impact of country legal regimes and company 
corporate governance practices on company performance in a cross-country 
framework. Corporate governance is nowadays a widely used concept with many 
studies of country legal regimes or company-specific corporate governance practices 
and structures. These studies have highlighted what aspects of legal regimes and main 
corporate governance practices can boost performance and explored the channels 
through which corporate governance may improve performance. Although both legal 
regimes and company practices have been found to matter in corporate governance, 
by how much each does has not much been researched to date.  By using data on 
company practices for companies from different legal regimes, we can specifically 
investigate the impact of country rules and detailed company-level practices on 
company valuation and degree of substitutability or complementarity between rules 
and practices.  We find that the magnitude of the impact of company specific 
corporate governance practices varies by different legal systems and, in particular, we 
find that there can substitutions and even overregulation.  
The importance of corporate governance has become well established in recent 
years. Corporate governance can be expected to reduce agency problems among 
shareholders and between managers and shareholders, limiting private benefits and 
expropriation by controlling owners.  Better corporate governance also means better 
monitoring of management, which can translate into higher company performance. 
Much evidence supports these two channels (see Dennis and McConnell, 2003; and 
Claessens, 2006, for recent reviews). Typically, however, the existing empirical 
literature tackles the investigation of corporate governance from either only a country 
or company point of view.  In their widely cited papers, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 
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2000, henceforth LLSV) show that higher investor protection at country level is 
associated with greater access to finance, more capital markets development, and 
higher valuation. Within the same system, however, companies adopt different 
corporate governance practices. Starting with Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), a 
large number of studies have investigated how different corporate governance 
practices at the company level within a singular country affect shareholders, 
bondholders and investors and more generally company behavior and performance.  
These studies have tried to identify the corporate governance aspects most important 
for company behavior and valuation. 
Studying, however, both country level corporate governance regime and company 
corporate governance practices at the same time can be important.  For one, 
companies’ specific corporate governance choices have to be considered in light of 
the level of corporate governance regime at the country level. Take, for instance, two 
similar companies implementing exactly the same governance practices but located in 
two different countries. The corporate governance practices may be valued differently 
by investors depending on whether they are required or voluntarily adopted.  Or 
shareholders may consider some aspects of the legal regime as substitutes to corporate 
governance practice and value corporate governance practices differently depending 
on the legal regime in the country. Or, ceteris paribus, shareholders may prefer to 
invest in companies whose country of incorporation guarantees better protection in 
the eventuality of legal disputes, irrespective of the company corporate governance 
practices. Second, corporate governance practices are not independent of the legal 
regime and vice-versa.  Given current laws, a company may not have a 
choice⎯except to incorporate in another jurisdiction⎯but to adjust its corporate 
governance practices.  Institutional shareholders and corporations, if dissatisfied with 
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the country’s legal regime and corporate governance practices, may lobby to change 
the regime.  In other words, both the strength of country protection and companies’ 
corporate governance practices are aspects to account for when studying the impact of 
corporate governance. By taken both into account, we can detect which practices 
affect performance, any degree of complementarity/substitutability between practices 
and legal regimes, and the magnitude of impact on performance. For instance, we will 
understand whether the constitution of board committees is important, whether their 
independence plays a role, and to what extent they impact in the presence of different 
legal regimes. The characteristics of the countries analyzed allow us to focus our 
attention on the effects of regulation rather than corporate governance practices alone.  
When doing a cross-country analysis, the variety in corporate governance 
practices increases and, given the differences in legal regimes and consequent 
requirement, it will be all the more important to capture all the various corporate 
governance aspects.  In part because they focus on one country only, however, the 
majority of the company-level studies only cover a few corporate governance aspects.  
The fact that studies for different countries looking at the association between board 
independence and performance have found contradictory results (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003), may be due to the lack of a comprehensive coverage of aspects of 
corporate governance practices.1 A company may not have an independent board, but 
may have strong board committees and a non-entrenched board, which still guarantee 
appropriate internal and external (market) monitoring. Moreover, for a cross-country 
analysis it will be important to cover as much of the specifics of the countries as 
possible, especially the details of the different legal frameworks, or other various 
                                                 
1 For instance, the study by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) limit the coverage of corporate 
governance to the presence (or the lack) of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) in companies’ charters, 
thus potentially ignoring other important governance practices 
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aspects affecting the impact of corporate governance practices.  Here, building on 
LLSV-contributions, much progress has been made in recent years to document 
various aspects of countries’ legal regimes, and we can draw on this literature. 
To our knowledge, only two studies have so far looked at both macro and micro 
perspectives. Durnev and Kim (2005) and Klapper and Love (2004) show the impact 
of corporate governance to be a decreasing function of legal protection. However, 
these studies have used only a broad measure of corporate governance in the form of 
an index based on the responses from financial analysts on aspects of transparency, 
independence, accountability, social responsibility and discipline. Apart from being 
more subjective, which can introduce biases, such index treats all corporate 
governance practices equally. However, for US companies, Bebchuk et al. (2004) find 
that not everything equally matters for performance, and that the associations between 
a broad index and performance may be driven by only few aspects.   More generally, 
with more detail on corporate governance practices one can answers specific 
questions like: Is it more important to have an independent board or to leave more 
monitoring powers to shareholders? Is greater transparency beneficial to 
shareholders? Do compensation arrangements give incentives to managers to exert 
more effort, and hence generate higher performance? How do these aspects impact 
depend on the local legal regimes?  Are there interactions between certain aspects of 
legal regimes and corporate governance practices in terms of company performance? 
The Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) dataset provides us with a unique 
opportunity to investigate the interaction between the corporate governance regime at 
the country and company’s level, and performance in a cross-country framework. The 
coverage of companies and countries is quite wide, approximately 5300 U.S. 
companies and 2400 non-U.S. companies from 22 advanced economies for the period 
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2003 – 2005.  In contrast to the above empirical studies, not only we do have a broad 
measure of the company’s corporate governance quality in the form of an index, but 
we actually know the adopted corporate governance practices of each company. 
Amongst others, ISS gathers information on the composition and independence of 
boards and committees, the level of shareholders’ involvement in the company’s 
decisions, compensation agreements, and relations with the auditors. 
Using this data, we find that across all 23 countries mainly three corporate 
governance channels are positively and significantly associated with performance: the 
country-level protection of minority shareholders, the degree of board independence, 
and the existence and independence of board committees. The importance of minority 
rights protection has been well documented. The independency of board committees 
matters more for performance than simply their formal existence. Also, the level of 
board entrenchment is inversely associated with performance, but this evidence is 
weaker. On the contrary, transparency and compensation practices do not seem to be 
associated with superior performance or better incentives for managers. The corporate 
governance channels are particularly evident for highly financial dependent industries, 
where strong and independent boards mean more highly valued companies. Corporate 
governance helps relax external financing constraints, by alleviating signaling 
problems, and ensures that managers exert enough effort in value maximizing projects 
and do not expropriate private benefits. We also find evidence that strong corporate 
governance practices pay off less for small size companies, maybe because strong 
corporate governance practices involves cost in terms of monitoring, time and 
resources which could offset the benefits. However, once we control for cross-
industry differences in external financing dependence, we find that size no longer 
 5
matters, which suggest that corporate governance matters more for external financing, 
independently of size considerations.  
Importantly, we find substitution effects between the strength of legal protection 
and the companies’ corporate governance practices. In particular, we find that better 
country level investor protection matters less when companies already have strong 
internal corporate governance (and vice-versa).  We even find that excessive 
regulation can harm valuation, consistent with the hypothesis that excessive 
regulation can harm managerial initiative and generate lower returns.  This has 
important consequences from a regulatory viewpoint. If high investor protection in the 
form of strong, independent, and pro-shareholder boards is already in place, as for the 
average US company, there is less value to increase the regulatory burden.2 On the 
contrary, if companies of a specific country tend to adopt weak corporate governance 
practices, regulatory intervention will definitively beneficial. This is the case, for 
instance, for Italian and Belgian companies, which rank well below the overall sample 
mean for level of board entrenchment and independence, or existence and 
independence of board committees.  
We contribute to the literature in various ways, both in findings and 
methodological aspects. In terms of findings, we are the first to document the possible 
counter-effects of strong regulation. The fact that strong regulation does not necessary 
mean optimal regulation has important policy implications. By bearing in mind that 
stronger corporate governance does not necessary mean better corporate governance 
and assessing the impact of the different corporate governance channels, a policy-
                                                 
2 This is in line with the increasing debate among academics, politicians, and practitioners about the 
negative effects of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Law. 
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maker can decide whether to intervene is an efficient way to improve companies’ 
performance and shareholders’ returns.  
In methodological aspects, by using detailed panel data on companies’ corporate 
governance practices, we can be less concerned about reverse causality issues. Since 
we base our analysis on detailed aspects of corporate governance, we can also 
disentangle the channels through which corporate governance acts.  We furthermore 
ensured that our results are robust to the inclusion of different and various control 
variables, the use of different statistic techniques and performance variables (Tobin’s 
Q and ROA), and autocorrelation issues. We furthermore show that corporate 
governance acts especially as a bonding-monitoring-discipline device for companies 
that can expect much external financing by applying the Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
methodology of identifying industries that heavily rely on external financing.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature.  
Section 3 describes corporate governance indicators, the main financial data used in 
the analysis and the empirical methodology used.  Section 4 discusses the results and 
section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature 
We are interested in disentangling different aspects of corporate governance, 
inter-relating these aspects with country-specific measures of legal protection and 
studying their association with performance.  We want to do this since such analysis 
will teach us whether the implementation of more corporate governance practices and 
legal requirements is unconditionally reflected in higher firm performance. For 
instance, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) find that the more antitakeover 
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provisions (ATPs) a company has in its charter, the lower its performance is.3 
However, the literature has identified some examples of the counter-effects of strong 
corporate governance. For instance, Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2003) point out that 
there is a difference between strong corporate governance and optimal corporate 
governance, as stronger corporate governance does not necessary mean better 
performance and higher valuation because costs may offset the benefits. The optimal 
trade-off depends, among others, on the degree of interaction between internal 
(boards, committees, company charters, disclosure rules) and external (takeovers, 
product market competition, ownership structure, legal protection) mechanisms of 
corporate governance.  
Theory suggests that there can be trade-offs from more corporate governance 
requirements. Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) argue in particular that too much 
monitoring and legal protection may hurt managerial initiative and consequently 
generate lower returns and valuation. They argue that constraints on managers 
through monitoring may be costly precisely because managerial discretion comes with 
benefits. The manager is less inclined to show initiative, like searching for new 
investment projects, when shareholders are more likely to interfere. Along the same 
lines, Boot et al. (2006) find that corporate governance controls may sometimes 
prevent management from doing what it wants, thus exacerbating agency problems. In 
other words, there is a trade-off between the gains from monitoring and those from 
managerial initiative and excessive monitoring can therefore be inefficient. 
Furthermore, there is at least anecdotal evidence that the implementation of 
corporate governance practices may not be the result of an optimal contracting, but of 
                                                 
3However, some other studies show that this methodology not only can be incorrect (Arcot and Bruno, 
2006) or not associated with performance (Core et al., 2006), but even assuming it is valid, its 
association with performance is not necessary monotonic (Hannes, 2002). 
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external pressures. Increasingly, public opinion, press, and institutional investors 
consider corporate governance a tick-box exercise, where the more boxes ticked, the 
better (Arcot and Bruno, 2006).  Numerous, sophisticated corporate governance 
practices inside companies are being required by investors. Worldwide, there is also 
an increasing appetite for more regulation and rigid laws (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley, hedge 
funds transparency law, reforms of the company laws), especially after corporate 
failures. But many of these requirements do not have strong theoretical, let alone 
empirical support that they help with firm performance. By using cross-country data, 
we can test what the impact of higher legal protection is in the presence of already 
elevated investors’ protection at company level (and vice-versa) on performance.  
Corporate governance is both a way to protect investors from managerial 
expropriation thus easing companies in accessing financing and enhancing valuation, 
and, more generally, a device to reduce agency costs and limit pet projects, leading to 
more efficient investments, boosting growth and performance. In particular, corporate 
governance can mitigate the problem of inefficient allocation of resources (credit 
rationing). Borrowers with large private benefits for which performance conveys little 
information about managerial actions, are more likely to see their positive NPV 
projects turned down by the capital markets (Tirole, 2006). In particular, when 
investor protection is low and corporate governance practices are hard to enforce, 
there will be a limit on the fraction of future cash flows that companies can credibly 
commit to outside investors (“limited pledgeability” of cash flow) (Almeida and 
Wolfenzon, 2005). In general, a company’s cost of funds will only be reduced to the 
extent that investors expect the company to be governed well after the funds have 
been raised. It is therefore important for the company to bond itself credibly to higher 
quality corporate governance (Doidge et al., 2004).  Corporate governance is in great 
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part about mitigating this commitment problem: “Corporate governance deals with 
the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
This problem is particularly large for companies that heavily rely on external 
financing.4  But a test whether companies which are heavy users of external finance 
are valued more when better corporate governance practices are in place can not 
unambiguously show that corporate governance reduces agency problems of moral 
hazard and adverse selection.  The reason is that associations between corporate 
governance and company financing dependence can arise from reverse causality when 
companies improve corporate governance practices as commitment devices when 
raising new funds. Conversely, being more external financing dependent could trigger 
changes in the companies’ corporate governance structure, in part as investors require 
changes. Therefore, using the actual external measure of external financing⎯as in 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998)⎯could create endogeneity problems.  
In a seminal paper, Rajan and Zingales (1998) show how external financing 
dependent companies grow more in countries with a higher level of financial 
development. They solve the simultaneity or omitted variable bias⎯financially more 
developed countries having companies with a greater degree of external 
financing⎯by identify an industry’s need for external finance from data on U.S. 
companies.  The U.S. can provide a benchmark for external financing dependence if 
two conditions hold: capital markets in the U.S. are relative frictionless, and a 
                                                 
4 Lombardo and Pagano (2002) formalize the above argument in a simple model. They argue that 
corporate governance, and more generally the legal environment, can affect the severity of agency 
problems between company insiders and outside shareholders in two ways. First, it may directly affect 
the private benefits that managers are able to extract from companies. This shifts the demand function 
upwards, thus increasing the quantity of external equity and reducing the cost of capital to companies 
in equilibrium. Second, it reduces the auditing and judicial costs that shareholders could potentially 
incur. This effect shifts the supply curve down, thus again increasing the quantity of available external 
finance. Overall, the effect on the equilibrium quantity is always positive. 
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technological demand at the industry level for external financing carries over to other 
countries. We use a similar theoretical argument to investigate whether companies 
belonging to industries that are financially more dependent are higher valued when 
displaying better corporate governance practices or regimes.  This provides a test 
whether corporate governance adds value because shareholders rights are more 
protected for those companies most in need of external financing, without the 
simultaneity problems.  
Despite conceptually similar, our analysis differs from the Rajan and Zingales’s 
methodology in two aspects. First, we do not just investigate a country-level measure 
of governance protection to evaluate the effects in the presence of different external 
financing dependence, but we also use a measure at the company level. Companies of 
the same country make different corporate governance choices, which may reflect in 
different valuations for companies within the same industry. A country-based measure 
of corporate governance alone, such as the LLSV (1998, 2006) antidirector index, 
would not fully capture companies’ corporate governance heterogeneity. Related, we 
use the detailed data on company’s corporate governance choices, which can identify 
what channels drive higher valuation in the presence of external financing needs.  
Second, we do not limit our analysis to manufacturing industries only, but include all 
companies (except for financial institutions). 
Besides affecting the availability and costs of external financing, corporate 
governance can affect economic performance in a number of ways. By putting more 
pressure on management and potentially punishing management for bad performance, 
better corporate governance encourages managers to pursue more value-maximizing 
projects, be more efficient in company operations, etc. (Jensen, 1986). These effects 
of corporate governance would not need to differ not in with external financing 
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dependence. They can be industry or country dependent, varying with company 
leverage, degree of assets intangibility or because of cross-listing in other exchanges.   
Another important variable affecting the impact of corporate governance on 
company valuation may be the size. In the corporate governance literature, some 
theories and empirical evidence imply that the strong corporate governance is more 
beneficial for larger companies than for small companies. For instance, Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein (2006) find that excessive regulation can be especially 
counterproductive for small companies, where the costs of complying with corporate 
governance rules more likely outweighs the benefits. In the general finance literature 
it has been found that size matters for company performance.  Small companies may 
have better growth opportunities and this is reflected in higher valuation (Shin and 
Stulz, 2000). Size also proxies for company age; older and larger companies tend to 
have a lower ratio market-to-book ratio (Durnev and Kim, 2005). Beck at al. (2005), 
for example, find that there is a size effect in the association between financial 
development and growth, possibly smaller companies face tighter credit constraints 
than large companies.   
In order to limit the endogeneity problem between the corporate governance 
choices and company size, we again apply the Rajan and Zingales methodology, by 
interacting companies’ corporate governance with a proxy for size at the industry 
level. Specifically, we test whether companies belonging to large-size industries 
perform better if they have stronger corporate governance than companies belonging 
to small-size industries. Among others, such evidence will highlight whether strong 
corporate governance is equally beneficial for large as for small companies.  
 
 
 12
3. Data and Econometric Model  
 
Data on corporate governance practices analyzed 
The corporate governance data come from the proxy voting agent Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS). ISS gathers corporate governance information of 
approximately 5300 U.S. companies and 2400 non-U.S. companies from Canada, 
Europe, East Asia and Pacific for the period 2003 – 2005. The non-U.S. companies it 
covers are all large and belong to the main indices of their respective country stock 
markets. For instance, the U.K. companies mainly belong to the FTSE350 index. On 
the contrary, the U.S. coverage is wider as it covers also mid- and small cap 
companies. Therefore, to avoid over-sampling problems we select a sub-sample of 
U.S. companies, specifically all those belonging to the S&P500 index. The sample 
then reduces to 7078 total company-year observations.  
In terms of corporate governance practices, ISS documents among others the 
presence or lack thereof of the following:  
- board independence: whether the board is controlled by a majority of 
independent outsiders; 
- nomination, compensation, and audit committees composition: whether the 
committees exist and if they consist solely of independent outsiders; 
- governance committee composition: whether the committee exists or not; 
- degree of board entrenchment: whether the board is annually elected (not 
staggered), whether no poison pills are in place, majority vote is required to 
amend charter/bylaws or to approve mergers; 
- whether chairman and CEO are separated; 
- whether former CEO sits on the board; 
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- whether dual class capital structure exist; 
- compensation characteristics: whether option re-pricing is prohibited, all 
stock-incentive plants are adopted with shareholders approval, company 
expenses options, and options grants align with company performance; 
- relations with the auditors: whether auditors are ratified at the recent 
shareholder meeting, and the fees paid to auditors are strictly audit fees; and 
- whether the CEO is not listed as having a related-party transaction in the 
proxy statement. 
In addition to this information ISS collects information on other corporate 
governance practices which we do not consider in our analysis.  This is in part 
because of missing or non available observations which reduce our sample too much.  
But it is also because of limited variability within countries among these corporate 
governance practices, which may be the consequence of legal requirements. For 
instance, the percentage of companies where shareholders may act by written consent 
is 99% for European and Asian companies: the inclusion of such item in our index 
would generate severe outlier problems which would drive the econometric results.5 
ISS also gather information on the size of the board, on whether directors have 
participated in ISS education programs, or on the authority of the board to hire own 
advisors. Such data are generally available, but their associations with performance 
                                                 
5 The problems of missing observations and limited variability concern especially the following 
corporate governance practices: shareholders may act by written consent or call special meetings, anti-
takeover characteristics (TIDE, sunset, trigger, etc) which are typical to the US but not to other 
markets, the existence of interlocks among compensation committee members, proxy contest defense, 
shareholders vote on directors selected to fill vacancies, board attendance. For these reasons, we can 
not construct all of the corporate governance provisions as done in Bebchuk et al (2004). Of the 18 
provisions considered by Bebchuk et al., for example, only 4 apply our sample us (limits to special 
meeting and written consent, no cumulative vote, blank check), while the other 14 are typical for the 
US only. Regardless, these 14 provisions do not appear to be significant in the Bebchuk study. 
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are not easily theoretically motivated. We therefore exclude them from our analysis to 
avoid any spurious results. 
Using the above provisions and on the basis of common earlier work and 
theoretical analysis, we construct five main different indices. 
1. Committees index.  Codes of best practices stress the importance of the 
committees as a corporate governance device. In particular, the presence of a 
nomination, compensation, audit and governance committee should guarantee 
a more transparent procedure of directors’ appointments, compensation 
approval and internal audit, respectively. We initially assign one point for each 
committee a company has: the resulting index, COMM1, therefore considers 
only the existence or not of a committee, and it ranges from 0 to 4. However, 
codes of corporate governance also advocate for a certain degree of 
independence of the committee members. We therefore create another index 
that gives points for strict independence of nomination, compensation and 
audit committees: the resulting index COMM2 ranges from 0 to 3.  
2. Entrenchment index. We follow Bebchuk et al. (2004), and we give one point 
each if a company has no poisons pills in place, if the board is annually elected 
(no staggered), if a majority is required for mergers and if a majority is 
required for charter amendments (no supermajority). Differently from 
Bebchuk et al., we do not have data on golden parachutes, and on charter and 
bylaws separately. The resulting index (BEBCHUK) varies from 0 to 4. 
3. Board independence index. We construct a dummy INDEP1 that takes 1 if a 
board consists of a majority of independent members, as judged by ISS. We 
also have information of the presence of the former CEO on the board and of 
the separation between CEO and Chairman, which are both proxy for a greater 
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division of the powers in the board, and hence of greater independence. Thus, 
we construct the index INDEP2, which gives points if there is no former CEO 
on the board and there is a majority of independent directors on the board 
(with the index to vary from 0 to 2), and the index INDEP3 which, in addition 
to INDEP2, considers whether the CEO and the Chairman are separated or not 
(with the index to vary from 0 to 3). 
4. Transparency index. In addition to the existence of the audit committees, a 
higher degree of transparency can be guaranteed by the ratification of the 
choice of auditors at the shareholders’ annual meeting. Further, if fees paid to 
the auditors do not include consulting charges, the existence of possible 
conflicts of interests will be less. Recent high-profile frauds and some 
accounting literature (e.g., Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2004) highlight the use of 
related party transactions as way of manipulation profits. We therefore give 
points if the auditors are ratified at the most recent annual meeting, if the fees 
are strictly audit fees, and if the CEO is not involved in related party 
transactions. The index TRANSP goes from 0 to 3. 
5. Compensation index. Some compensation practices could indicate limited 
shareholders’ power or monitoring on the board, leading to private benefits.  
We therefore give one point if shareholders have power in approving stock 
plans, if the options are expensed, if re-pricing is prohibited, and if the average 
options granted in the past three years as a percentage of basic shares (burn 
rate) did not exceed 3%  (which would be in line with the peers). The index 
COMP varies from 0 to 4. 
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Summary statistics 
 
Of the total 7078 observations in the ISS dataset, we exclude financial companies 
and companies of countries with no La Porta et al. (1997, 2006) LLSV index 
(Bermuda, 9 observations) or for which we have just one year observation: China (2 
observations), Cayman Island (1 observation), Israel (2 observations), Luxemburg (3 
observations), Thailand (1 observation), and South Africa (1 observation). We are 
thus left with a total of 5857 company-year observations, for which we have a 
complete set of information for what concerns the existence and independence of 
board committees (COMM1 and COMM2). However, we progressively lose 
observations in the construction of some of the other corporate governance indicators. 
In particular, we lose 228 observations in the creation of BEBCHUK, 750 in INDEP1, 
922 in INDEP2, 2348 in INDEP3, 2829 in TRANSP, and 2458 in COMP. Amongst 
others, we have very limited information about the level of board independence of 
Austrian companies (5 observations), and the separation of the roles between the 
Chairman and the CEO in Japan (3 observations), Portugal (3 observations), and 
Spain (5 observations).  
Table 1.A reports summary statistics of the governance indicators described above 
by country. The analysis of the data by country shows us an interesting picture of the 
differences in corporate governance practices across countries. Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Spain, and UK score the highest (5) in the LLSV index, while Greece and 
Belgium rank at the bottom with a score of 2. US companies tend to have all four 
board committees (on average COMM1=3.94), similar to Canadian companies 
(COMM1=3.82). At the bottom in terms of board committees, we find Danish 
(COMM1=0.11) and Austrian companies (COMM1=0.31). Danish companies stand 
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out also for the absence of independent committees (COMM2=0), while again US 
(COMM2=2.66) and Canadian (COMM2=1.97) companies are well above the sample 
average of COMM2=1.04. Companies in Hong Kong (BEBCHUK=2.06) tend to give 
more power of decision to shareholders. On matters of board independence, Italian 
and Japanese companies are clearly at the bottom of the rank in all three corporate 
governance indicators (INDEP1, INDEP2, INDEP3). There is not much variation in 
the TRANP index across countries. Finally, Canadian (COMP=3.42) and British 
companies (COMP=3.29) tend to be more strict on matters regarding compensation. 
Table 1.B shows the percentage of incidence of the corporate governance 
provisions per indicator. For the COMM1 indicator, most companies have an audit 
committee (83%), but only in 40% of the cases, do companies have an audit 
committee consisting of a majority of independent members. Similarly, in roughly 
half of cases, companies have a nomination committee (52%), but only in 26% of the 
cases we observe an independent nomination committee. Only in 31% of cases do 
companies have a governance committee. The absence of poisons pills (80%) clearly 
stands out as the driver of the BEBCHUK index, while in only very few cases (10%) 
a simple majority is required to amend the company charters/bylaws. In 72% of 
companies, there is no former CEO on the board (INDEP2), and in 91% of company-
year observations the CEO is not considered to have related party transactions 
(TRANSP). Finally, shareholders’ approval of stock plans is largely required (89%), 
but only in 36% of the cases is the option burn rate in line with peers.  
Table 1.C shows the overlap or lack thereof between country-level requirements 
and corporate governance practices, and among corporate governance practices.  For 
instance, it shows the relation between the level of investor protection (LLSV) and the 
existence of committees (COMM1). The majority of companies in countries with the 
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LLSV index less than 3 has no committees in the board (6.45%). However, when 
LLSV index is equal to 3 the majority has all four committees (20.23%). When LLSV 
index is between 3.5 and 4, only one committee is present on average (23.99%).  
Finally, when LLSV index is higher than four, in the majority of the cases (14.22%) 
do companies have three committees. Therefore, there is not a clear and 
monotonically trend between investor protection at the country level and the existence 
of board committees.  
Similarly, we can consider the correlation between the indicators BEBCHUK and 
LLSV. In the majority of the cases, BEBCHUK is equal to one, independently from 
the LLSV value. Also, when BEBCHUK =1, COMM1=1 or COMM1=3 are equally 
likely. We also see some congruence among company corporate governance practices. 
There are, for example, a large number of companies with both all four board 
committees and an independent board (31.11%). However, board independence is 
uncorrelated with the presence of all four provisions in the BEBCHUK indicator 
(2.99%) 
 
Financial data 
For U.S. companies, financial data are downloaded from COMPUSTAT, while for 
non-U.S. companies we use Worldscope data. As mentioned before, our companies 
are large in size, with an average total assets of $US10 million and an average total 
sales of $US7.9 million (Table 1.D).  
 We use Tobin’s Q as our main performance measure. We construct it following 
the method in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and subsequently also used in Gompers et 
al. (2003).  Specifically, Tobin's Q is defined as the market value of assets divided by 
the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is computed as book value 
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of assets plus the market value of common stock less the sum of the book value of 
common stock and balance sheet deferred taxes. The average Tobin’s Q of the 
companies in our sample is 1.67. In our robustness checks, we also use Return on 
Assets (ROA), where ROA is defined as the ratio of the earnings before interests, 
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to the book value of assets. The 
average ROA of the companies in our sample is 0.06. 
As control variables, we use the logarithm of sales (LOG_SALES), the ratio 
property-plants-equipments to sales (PPE_SALES), the 1 year growth of sales (G_S), 
the ratio capital expenditures to sales (CAPEX_SALES), the ratio total debt to 
common equity (D_E), and a dummy ADR equal to 1 if a company had traded 
American Depository Receipts.6  
We construct the measure of external financing dependence as in Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) by using the COMPUSTAT universe of US companies for the year 
2000.  The Rajan and Zingales original industrial measure refers to only US 
manufacturing industries for the year 1980; as our data are for the period 2003-2005, 
we construct an update measure of the 2000 US external financing dependence for all 
2 digit SIC code industries. Originally, Rajan and Zingales use the 3 digits ISIC code 
for identifying industries, which typically corresponds to the two digits SIC code.  A 
company’s dependence on external finance is defined as the ratio of capital 
expenditures minus cash flow from operations divided by capital expenditures.7
 
                                                 
6 We take the 1% and 99% centile of the variables G_S and D_E due to the presence of serious outliers. 
As common in the literature, we also drop negative values of common equity. 
7 Differently from Rajan and Zingales (1998), for the period 2000, the variable cash flow from 
operations (COMPUSTAT item 110) is no longer available due to a change in accounting rules. Cash 
flow is therefore calculated as the sum of COMPUSTAT items 123, 125, 126, 106, 213, and 217, plus 
the change in working capital (the sum of COMPUSTAT items 302, 303, and 304). Capital 
expenditures are calculated as the sum of COMPUSTAT items 128 and 129. 
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Econometric model and strategy 
To investigate the associations between corporate governance, external financing 
dependence and performance, we use two econometric specifications. 
 
Corporate governance and performance 
We regress Tobin’s Q on indicators of companies’ corporate governance and the 
strength of legal environment, while controlling for industry, time, and other firm 
characteristics, over the period 2003 – 2005. Specifically, we estimate the following 
cross-country OLS regression with time and industry fixed effects: 
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where Y is Tobin’s Q, the country variable is the La Porta et al. (1998) country 
anti-director rights index as revised by Djankov et al. (2006), whileCG is the (vector 
of)  the company corporate governance indicator(s) as described above. And in terms 
of indexes, c is country, i is company, and t is time.  
LLSV
We control for the usual variables found  to be associated with performance, size, 
tangibility of assets, and cross-listing in other exchanges, for which we use the 
logarithm of sales (in US$), the ratio property, plants, and equipment (PPE) to sales, 
and a dummy equal to 1 if a firm trades American Depository Receipts (ADRs) as 
proxies. As argued in Durnev and Kim (2005), we use sales because it is less affected 
than earnings by diversion, manipulation, and different accounting rules; however, 
our results are robust to the use of the logarithm of total assets as well. We use the 
ratio of PPE to sales because companies operating with higher proportions of fixed 
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assets (and lower proportions of intangible assets) may find it less optimal to adopt 
stricter governance mechanisms to signal to investors that they intend to prevent the 
future misuse of intangible assets (Klapper and Love, 2004). Finally, empirical 
evidence suggests that companies cross-listed on US exchanges are valued higher 
(Doidge et al., 2004; Coffee, 2002). In addition, as further robustness checks we use a 
second set of controls as in Black et al. (2005): the ratio of capital expenditures to 
sales, the ratio of total debt to equity, and 1 year growth of sales, to control for 
investment intensity, leverage, and growth opportunities, respectively.  
Regression (1) is run with time fixed effects, 2-digit SIC code industry fixed 
effects, and clustered standard error at country level as this is the source of possible 
autocorrelation. We do not use country fixed effects because the LLSV acts as a 
country dummy already, nor company fixed effects because, as in Gompers et al. 
(2003), we do not have enough variability in the corporate governance indicators over 
the short time period we consider. As common in this literature, financial companies 
are excluded in the main regressions, but we do perform robustness checks including 
financial companies.  
Theoretical and empirical literatures predict the coefficients 21,ββ  to be positive, 
while γ  to be negative. Since we are interested is the overall economic effect of an 
increase in the investors’ protection strength in the presence of different company’s 
corporate governance practices, we investigate as well some net effects by summing 
various coefficients. 
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Corporate governance, external financing dependence, and performance 
To test whether companies belonging to industries that typically are more 
financially dependent perform better with better corporate governance, we use the 
Rajan and Zingales methodology to overcome causality issues in the analysis of the 
associations between corporate governance, external financing dependence and 
performance.  Specifically, we interact the measure of industry external financing 
dependence with a measure of the company’s corporate governance quality CG  and 
estimate the following model: 
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where  is the Rajan and Zingales measure of dependence on external 
financing at the industry level k, and  is the logarithm of sales. Y  and CG are as 
defined above. The regression is run with country, industry, and time fixed effects, 
with robust standard errors clustered at the industry level. The United States is 
dropped as it is the benchmark. To control for legal characteristics, instead of fixed 
country effects, we alternatively use the index of investors’ protection. As 
valuation measure we use Tobin’s Q.   
DEPEXT _
Size
LLSV
If corporate governance matters more for external financing dependent companies, 
we would expect the coefficient β  of the interaction term to be positive and 
significant. If so, this would suggest that corporate governance is especially important 
to guarantee an efficient allocation of external capital resources and high returns. The 
better monitoring of the management enhances investors’ confidence for those 
companies and lead to higher company’s valuation.  
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As robustness checks, we control for the tangibility of companies’ assets and 
cross-listing in other exchanges. We also run cross-section versions of regression (2) 
to filter the time effect in the estimation. In this specification, we consider the year 
with the greatest number of observations (2005) in order to limit the problem of losing 
too many degrees of freedoms and we take the two-year 2004-2005 average Tobin’s 
Q as performance measure.   
 
Corporate governance, external financing dependence, size and performance 
 
As in other papers, we check whether our evidence is robust even when 
controlling for cross-industry differences in size. As a proxy measure of each 
industry’s natural size, we use the industry k’s share of employment in companies 
with more than 20 employees in the United States.8 The models we estimate with this 
size variable are then9: 
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8 Such proxy is available from the 2000 U.S. Census for industries classified according to the 3 digit 
NAICS code. We then converted the 3 digit NAICS into 2 digit SIC code for the following reasons. 
First, the original test by Rajan and Zingales (1998) mainly uses three digit ISIC codes, that 
corresponds to the 2 digit SIC codes. Secondly, the number of industries classified according to the 3 
digit NAICS code is almost double of the number of companies classified according to the 2 digit SIC 
code. Since in our regression we control also for industry fixed effects, other than countries and time 
dummies, this could generate a lost of degree of freedoms. There are few cases where more than one 
industry classified according to the 3 digit NAICS code correspond to one industry classified according 
to the 2 digit SIC code. In such circumstances, we take the average. 
9 As in Beck et al. (2005), we find a very small positive correlation between Large Firm Share and 
External Dependence, which suggests that the industry characteristics explaining firm size are not the 
same as the characteristics explaining technological dependence on external finance. 
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where  is the 2 digit SIC code industry k’s share of employment in 
companies with more than 20 employees in the United States as from the U.S. 
Census, and   and are as defined above. The regressions are 
run with country, industry, and time fixed effects, with robust standard error clustered 
at the industry level. Again, if corporate governance matters more for large and high 
external financing dependent companies, we would expect the coefficients 
sharefirmLarge
,Y ,_ DEPEXT Size CG
1β  and 2β  
to be positive and significant. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Corporate governance and performance 
We first show the results of the associations between governance choices and 
performance, estimated from equation (1). As we face missing observations, we first 
consider the association of the indices COMM1, BEBCHUK, and INDEP1 with 
Tobin’s Q, as these three indices have the most observations (Table 2). 
When we consider the three indices separately10 (columns I, II, and III), each of the 
coefficients are positive and significant at the 1% level, meaning that the existence of 
board committees, lack of entrenchment at the board level, and board independence 
are positively associated with higher valuation. The interaction terms with LLSV are 
                                                 
10 Additionally, we replicate the test performed in Bebchuk et al. (2004) on US companies only. We 
find that the governance indicator BEBCHUK is positive and significant also for our sample of 
companies. Bebchuk et al., however, do not control for potential autocorrelation, but only for 
heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional dependence (Fama Mac-Beth). However, autocorrelation is an 
important issue in panel data. Indeed, when we regress Tobin’s Q on the indicator BEBCHUK for our 
sample of US companies, we find that the governance coefficient is significant at 2% level when using 
White heteroskedastic errors, but only at 9% when clustering at the company level. 
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all negative and significant, which means that the impact of these corporate 
governance practices at the company level is less when investors’ protection at 
country level is already high. The index BEBCHUK becomes significant at only the 
10% level when is not included alone in the regression, and in particular, the 
interaction with LLSV is not significant.  
By calculating the economic impact of the constructed indices we can show the 
impact of changes in legal reforms, where we find a result suggesting possible 
overregulation. The regression result of column VI implies that a one point increase in 
the LLSV anti-director index is associated with an increase in Tobin’s Q of 0.328 - 
0.087 * COMM1 - 0.198 * INDEP1. The overall magnitude of the impact of legal 
reform thus depends on the degree of corporate governance in place at the board level, 
and in particular, investor country protection is the less relevant the better the board 
governance already is. For instance, when COMM1 = 1 and INDEP1 = 0, the level 
Italian companies at which are on average, the effect of an increase of one in the 
LLSV index corresponds to an increase in Tobin’s Q by 0.241, of a 14% increase over 
the average Q of 1.67. However, for COMM1=4 and INDEP1=0, higher shareholder 
protection at the country level is associated with a small decrease in Q by 0.02, 1% 
less than the average Tobin’s Q. The effect is more negative when the board consists 
of a majority of independent directors (INDEP1=1), as is for example, the case for US 
companies, because an increase in LLSV-index of one is associated with a decrease in 
Tobin’s Q by 0.218.11
We can also consider the impact of a one-point increase in COMM1 on Tobin’s 
Q: this is equal to 0.429 - 0.087 x LLSV, which means that if LLSV is 5, as in the 
                                                 
11 In our sample there are 1589 company-year observations having COMM1=4 and INDEP=1, the 
largest majority of which having the LLSV index equal to 3. 
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case of UK, the impact is roughly nil. This suggests that constituting board 
committees is almost irrelevant when investors’ protection is already high at the 
country level. This is not true, however, when considering the degree of board 
independence INDEP1, as the overall effect is still positive even when the LLSV 
index is at 5.  
The coefficients of the control variables are in line with the results found in the 
literature (e.g., Shin and Stulz, 2000, Durnev and Kim, 2005): size (log of sales) and 
capital intensity (the ratio property, plants, and equipments over sales) are negative 
and highly significant, while the dummy ADR is positive and significant. 
Furthermore, such results are confirmed even when we cluster the standard error at 
the company level (results not shown here). However, the significance of all the 
coefficients dramatically increases, which may indicate that we are underestimating 
the true standard errors and clustering at country level is therefore more appropriate. 
We perform several robustness checks, to confirm both the significance of the 
results and the economic impact of the corporate governance variables (Table 3). 
First, we run regression (1) including financial companies (SIC code 6). The results 
found before are confirmed, and they are actually more significant (column I). The 
coefficient of BEBCHUK is significant at the 1.5% and the interaction with the LLSV 
is now significant at the 3.3%.  When we consider the economic effects, the overall 
negative effect on performance in the case of strong corporate governance is still 
confirmed.   
High values of Tobin’s Q may be triggered by special circumstances not captured 
by other variables, including industry fixed effects. This may be the case, for instance, 
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for high-tech companies,12 which are associated with higher valuation by nature. To 
control for this, we run regression (1) excluding such companies:13 the coefficient of 
BEBCHUK loses its significant, but all the previous results remain valid (column II).   
We further control for differences in the legal systems which may not be entirely 
captured by the LLSV anti-director index (column III). Indeed, different corporate 
governance practices could be due to existing different country regulations and 
historical traditions. For instance, UK and European companies are characterized by a 
flexible regulatory system known as “comply or explain”, which companies do not 
have to abide by law. On the contrary, US and Canadian companies follow a tradition 
of legislative provisions rather than regulatory practices. We control for these 
institutional differences by adding dummies for continents (Europe, Asia, and 
America). The signs and coefficients of the corporate governance variables for the 
resulting regression are largely not affected by this inclusion: the coefficients of 
COMM1 and INDEP1 are now significant at the 1.9% level, and in particular the 
effect of board independence is slightly lower (from 0.97 – column VI, Table 2 – to 
0.79).  The negative impact of strong regulation is still confirmed: on average, an 
increase of one in the LLSV index is associated with a decrease in Tobin’s Q by 0.19 
if the company has all 4 committees and an independent board. 
Durnev and Kim (2005) argue that the LLSV antidirector index captures only de 
jure aspects of regulation, but not de facto levels of enforcement.14 In their paper, they 
                                                 
12 Such companies are identified by the 4 digit SIC codes:  3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, 3579, 3651, 
3652, 3661, 3663, 3669, 3671, 3672, 3675, 3676, 3677, 3678, 3679, 3674, 3821, 3822, 3823, 3824, 
3825, 3826, 3829, 3827, 3861, 3812, 3844, 3845, 4812, 4813, 4822, 4841, 4899, 7371, 7372, 7373, 
7374, 7375, 7376, 7377, 7378, 7379. 
13 Financial companies are again excluded. 
14 This is not entirely correct, because the LLSV index measures, amongst others, the difficulty faced 
by minority shareholders in challenging resolution that benefit controlling shareholders but damage the 
company. Further, in our sample we do not have countries like Ghana or Kazakhstan that score the 
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correct for the level of enforcement by multiplying the LLSV index by the rule of law, 
an index developed by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Unfortunately, 
we do not have an update measure of the rule of law for our sample period. We 
overcome this problem by taking the ex-post measure of private control of self-
dealing developed by Djankov et al (2006).15 This index of private enforcement looks 
at the ease with which minority shareholders can prove wrongdoing of management 
or controlling shareholders. We therefore create the variable LEGAL by multiplying 
the LLSV anti-director index and the ex-post private control of self-dealing. The new 
index ranges from a minimum of 0.74 to a maximum of 5, with a standard deviation 
of 1.021. We use this variable as a measure of the effective degree of investors’ 
protection in our regression, as it takes into consideration both de jure and de facto 
levels of investors’ protection.  
Column IV shows the results. The impact of LEGAL is positive and significant. 
The coefficients of COMM1 and INDEP1 remain positive and significant, and the 
interaction terms with LEGAL are negative and significant at the 4% and 10% percent 
respectively. The effects of excessive regulation are clear from this econometric 
specification as well: following the same example as above, when COMM1 = 4 and 
INDEP1 = 1 one standard deviation increase in LEGAL is associated with a decrease 
in Tobin’s Q by 0.13. 
                                                                                                                                            
maximum (5) as UK does. Nevertheless, we correct the LLSV index for the degree of enforcement, 
too. 
15 The self-dealing index constructed by Djankov et al. (2006) is the sum of two indices: the ex-ante 
private control of self-dealing and the ex-post control of self dealing. The ex-ante index keeps track of 
disclosure and approval requirements imposed by law and in some aspects it is very similar to the 
LLSV index. Not surprising, for our sample of countries the correlation between the LLSV index and 
the ex-ante private control of self-dealing index is very high (0.70). The ex-post control of self dealing 
mainly looks at enforceability issues (standing rights to sue, ease of holding management or the body 
liable for civil damages) as it scores how easy it is for minority shareholders to obtain redress through 
the courts in case of legal disputes.  
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As further robustness checks, we include three extra control variables in equation 
(1): the one year growth of sales to control for growth opportunities (G_S), the ratio 
of capital expenditures to sales to control for investment opportunities 
(CAPEX_SALES), and the ratio debt to equity to control for leverage and degree of 
debt financiers’ monitoring (D_E) (column V). The results found confirm the 
evidence mentioned above.  
Finally, we perform additional robustness checks (results not shown here). We use 
return on assets (ROA) as a performance measure instead of Tobin’s Q. The 
coefficients of the LLSV index, COMM1 and INDEP1 are still significant at the 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively, as well as are the interaction terms. We also modify the 
indicator COMM1 by excluding the information on the existence of the governance 
committee. The presence of a governance committee is not advocated by all codes of 
corporate governance, and in general it is believed that the presence of a nomination, 
audit, and compensation committee is more important to assure effective monitoring 
by the board than the existence of a governance committee. Our results, however, are 
not affected by this modification in the COMM1 indicator. We also run regression (1) 
excluding companies with dual class capital structures and the results do not change.16 
Finally, to assure that the significance and the magnitude of the coefficients estimated 
are not driven by outliers, we perform two checks: we run regression (1) using the 
quantile methodology and winsorising the values of Tobin’s Q at the 1%. The signs, 
coefficients and the overall negative effect in the case of strong corporate governance 
are all confirmed under these specifications. 
                                                 
16 Bebchuk et al. (2004) exclude firms with a dual class structure, arguing that in these companies the 
holding of superior voting rights might be sufficient to provide incumbents with a powerful 
entrenching mechanism that renders other entrenching provisions relatively unimportant. 
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In Table 4, we investigate whether other company corporate governance features, 
as captured by the indices INDEP2, INDEP3, TRANSP and COMP, are significantly 
associated with Tobin’s Q. Such indices are more refined because they consider, for 
instance, other aspects of independence rather than simply the percentage of 
independent members on the board. However, the sample is reduced by 30-50% and 
these results thus have to be considered with some caveats.  
The indices INDEP2 and INDEP3 are never significant (columns I and II), which 
suggests that in terms of independence, what matters is the effective independence at 
board level rather than other matters such as the separation of the CEO/Chairman 
roles.17 In this context, it is important to highlight that the ISS use stricter criteria 
when judging independence than what companies effectively state in their annual 
reports. The evidence nevertheless confirms some of existing studies which find 
contradictory results on the performance effect of the separations between 
CEO/Chairman (e.g., Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell, 1997). 
Also, while TRANSP and COMP do not seem to impact performance (columns III 
and IV), the coefficients of the indices COMM1 and INDEP1 continue to remain 
positive and significant, while BEBCHUK is significant in 3 out of 4 specifications. 
Finally, we analyze the impact of the three indices covering the composition and 
level of independence of the board committees (Table 5). We run again equation (1), 
adding the three committee indices and the entrenchment index one by one.  We 
exclude the dummy on board independence since the probability of having 
independent committees depends, amongst other, on the degree of independence of 
the board. Including simultaneously highly correlated variables, such as board and 
                                                 
17 We also run regression (1) with a dummy equal to 1 if the company has a separated CEO/Chairman. 
Both the estimated coefficient and the interaction term are not significant. 
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committees independence, could create multicollinearity problems and underestimate 
true standard errors.  
We first consider COMM1 and COMM2 separately (columns I, and II, 
respectively).  The coefficient of COMM2 is higher than the coefficient of COMM1, 
highlighting a greater impact of independence of committees rather than the mere 
existence of them. These results remain even after adding the BEBCHUK index to the 
regressions (columns III and IV). The coefficient of the interaction terms are again 
negative and significant, suggesting a greater impact in case of lower investors’ 
protection. As before, an increase in the LLSV anti-director index is associated with a 
decrease in Tobin’s Q when corporate governance practices of the company already 
suggest an elevated level of protection. All the above results are robust to the 
inclusion of continental dummies and further control variables, and using return on 
assets (ROA) as a performance variable (results not reported). 
 
Corporate governance, external financing dependence, and performance 
We next discuss the results of the associations between corporate governance, 
financing dependence and performance using regression specification (2). Table 6 
shows the coefficients of the interaction term when taking the governance indicators 
one by one, with the logarithm of sales as the only control firm variable. The 
regression is estimated using OLS and includes country, industry, and time dummies. 
The interaction terms coefficients of external financing dependence with COMM1, 
COMM2, INDEP1, and INDEP2 are all positive and significant, while BEBCHUK, 
INDEP3, TRANSP, and COMP are not statistically significant.  This suggests that 
companies belonging to industrial sectors that rely more on external financing 
perform better the more board committees they have and if committees on the board 
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are independent. This can be interpreted as evidence that the market values strong and 
independent boards more than any other bonding practice when providing capital to 
companies. The channels are likely that a strong and independent board reduces moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems, and helps companies’ performance 
particularly when naturally dependent on external financing. 
In Table 7, we check whether the significance of the interaction terms related to 
COMM1, COMM2, INDEP1, and INDEP2 remains after adding as further controls 
the ratio PPE to sales, the dummy for ADR companies, and the LSSV index. We find 
that the magnitude and the significance of the results found above are confirmed.  We 
can show the importance of some corporate governance features for more financing 
dependent firms using the following example. The industries at the 33% and 66% 
percentile have a ratio of external financing dependence equal to 0.024 and 0.47 
respectively. The coefficient estimate for the interaction term for the regression in 
column I predicts that the difference between the valuation of the 33rd and 66th 
percentile financial dependent industry to be 2.3% higher in a company with an index 
COMM1 equal to 3 compared to a company with COMM1 equal to 1.   
We find further that the coefficient estimate of INDEP1 (0.10) (column V) is 
higher than that for committees COMM1 (0.026) and COMM2 (0.029), indicating the 
importance of board independence for valuation with regards to higher external 
financing dependence. This is confirmed in the regression presented in column IX. 
When including the interaction terms external dependence X COMM1 and external 
dependence X INDEP1 in the same econometric specification, the coefficient of the 
interaction with COMM1 is still positive but not significant anymore. The degree of 
independence of the board is reducing the impact on performance of the presence of 
 33
board committees, indicating that the market pays great attention to the degree of 
board independence when allocating funds. 
As robustness check, we run a cross-sectional version of the regression (2). In 
their original paper, Rajan and Zingales study the relations between external financing 
dependence, financial development and growth using a cross-section specification. In 
our test, we consider the corporate governance practices in the year 2005, because we 
have the largest number of observations. As dependent variable, we compute the two 
year average 2004 – 2005 Tobin’s Q. We run again regression (2) without time fixed 
effects and making the standard errors heteroscedastistic robust.  The results (Table 8) 
confirm that companies belonging to particularly highly financially dependent 
industries enjoy higher valuation when their corporate governance, represented by the 
indicators COMM1, COMM2, INDEP1 and INDEP2, is better.18
Finally, we check whether the associations between corporate governance, 
external financing dependence and performance are affected by the size of the 
company, avoiding issues of simultaneity by using the average size of the companies 
within the respective industry (regressions 3.1 and 3.2). The results in Table 9 show 
that companies belonging to industries with larger shares of big companies 
(regression 3.1) perform better if they have stronger corporate governance in the form 
of independent board committees and executives on the board (columns I, III, V, VII).  
This evidence suggests that the market views strong corporate governance to increase 
value only for those companies that are naturally large enough.  This could be because 
only these companies can naturally bear the costs of it.  When controlling for cross-
                                                 
18 We also ran regression (2) including the "direct" effects (e.g., we ran 
and 
so forth). The results on the interaction terms are unchanged and the coefficient of the COMM1 term is 
still signification, but COMM2, INDEP1, INDEP2 are not statistically significant. 
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industry differences in external financing dependence, we find that earlier results are 
only confirmed in the case of COMM1 (column II), but the coefficients of the 
interaction terms with external dependence remain significant in all the specifications, 
but the interaction term with size no longer (columns II, IV, VI, and VIII).   
Putting together the results from regression (1) and from regressions (2) and (3) 
on the associations between corporate governance, external financing, size and 
performance, reinforces the view that strong corporate governance can be very 
beneficial in the case of highly financial dependent companies, as it favors more 
efficient management and higher valuation. Overall, we can conclude that better 
corporate governance helps in efficient capital allocation, and subsequently 
performance, mainly for companies that depend heavily on external financing and for 
large companies, but too strict requirements may have costs for companies that 
largely relying internal financing and for small companies.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have analyzed how and through what channels corporate 
governance affects performance. Consistent with existing studies, we find that 
corporate governance exert a positive effect on performance. This is because 
corporate governance acts as a monitoring and discipline device, ensuring that 
management pursues value-maximizing goals. Not everything contributes equally to 
this association, though. The level of shareholder protection at country level, board 
committees, and independence seem to play a more important role in firm 
performance than other corporate governance practices.  
We also that corporate governance is more important to companies that especially 
rely on external financing. This is because corporate governance acts as a signaling 
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device of positive NPV projects, thus allowing a more efficient capital allocation in 
the presence of segmented markets. Once the funds have been allocated and the 
signaling role ends, corporate governance still ensures its positive role through the 
monitoring of the management.  
Finally, we find that an optimal form of corporate governance is not necessarily a 
strong form of corporate governance. Increasing the number and severity of country-
level regulations or the number of company-level practices may not always lead to 
superior performance. The straight-jacket imposed by strong corporate governance 
can, besides being costly, limit managerial freedom of initiative, and thereby 
negatively affecting performance. Overall our results suggest that only for large 
companies or for companies that naturally depend heavily on external financing do 
very strict corporate governance practices or requirements make sense. 
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TABLE 1.A: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS BY COUNTRY 
 
This table reports the legal regime variable (LLSV), the mean, minimum, and maximum of the corporate governance indicators by country. In particular, COMM1 considers the existence of 
board committees, while COMM2 their independence. BEBCHUK is constructed following the entrenchment index developed by Bebchuk et al. (2004). INDEP1 is a dummy equal to 1 if a 
board consists of a majority of independent directors. In addition to independence, INDEP2 takes into account the presence of the former CEO on the board, and INDEP3 the separation of the 
roles between the CEO and the Chairman, too. TRANSP ranks the degree of potential account manipulation within the company, while COMP looks at the presence of specific compensation 
agreements. The composition of each index is given in Table 1.B  
 
 
Indicator LLSV   COMM1   COMM2   BEBCHUK   INDEP1 INDEP2 INDEP3 TRANSP COMP
    
Min: 
0 
Max: 
5  
Min: 
0 
Max: 
4  
Min: 
0 
Max: 
3  
Min: 
0 
Max: 
4 Dummy  
Min: 
0 
Max: 
2  
Min: 
0 
 Max: 
3  
Min: 
0 
 Max: 
3  
Min: 
0  
Max: 
4  
                           Obs. Value Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
Country                            
AUSTRALIA 205                          4 205 2.77 205 0.85 205 1.02 203 0.57 203 1.41 203 2.23 145 1.30 72 2.76
AUSTRIA 47                       2.5 47 0.31 47 0.00 47 1.00 5 0.80 5 1.60 5 2.60 7 1.85 17 2.17
BELGIUM 47                          2 47 1.25 47 0.25 47 0.74 22 0.27 15 0.80 15 1.66 2 1.50 5 2.60
CANADA 466                          4 466 3.82 466 1.97 466 1.99 465 0.86 462 1.59 461 2.20 157 1.89 101 3.42
DENMARK 61                         4 61 0.11 61 0.06 58 1.56 18 0.88 18 1.72 18 2.11 29 1.62 5 2.40
FINLAND 81                          3.5 81 0.86 81 0.48 77 1.80 44 0.65 44 1.59 44 2.04 12 1.41 10 2.90
FRANCE 215                          3 215 2.34 215 0.33 211 0.83 194 0.26 185 1.08 185 1.47 189 1.19 55 2.27
GERMANY 217                          2.5 217 0.65 217 0.01 217 1.05 57 0.75 55 1.29 55 1.94 29 1.58 87 2.00
GREECE 112                          2 112 0.38 112 0.04 63 2.01 73 0.04 37 0.94 37 1.40 3 2.00 6 2.83
HONG KONG 140                          5 140 1.48 140 0.62 110 2.06 136 0.08 135 0.95 135 1.57 47 1.85 NA NA
IRELAND 33                          4 33 3.09 33 0.90 33 1.00 32 0.31 32 1.18 32 1.59 10 1.90 3 4.00
ITALY  122                          2.5 122 1.13 122 0.09 121 1.04 84 0.08 50 0.76 50 1.42 59 1.76 24 2.83
JAPAN  1409                          3.5 1409 1.04 1409 0.01 1407 1.35 1408 0.00 1407 0.57 3 1.00 932 1.89 1389 1.42
NETHERLANDS 123                       3 123 1.25 123 0.72 115 0.74 51 0.92 47 1.76 47 2.59 15 1.46 29 2.58
NEW ZEALAND 38                          4 38 2.71 38 0.34 38 1.00 37 0.37 37 0.97 37 1.70 24 1.66 8 2.87
NORWAY 58                          3.5 58 0.43 58 0.24 51 1.15 17 0.82 16 1.75 16 2.37 15 1.60 6 2.16
PORTUGAL 33                          2.5 33 0.42 33 0.09 27 1.03 19 0.26 4 1.00 3 2.00 10 1.40 5 3.00
SINGAPORE 119                          5 119 2.55 119 0.87 55 1.40 107 0.50 98 1.39 94 2.18 27 1.96 NA NA
SPAIN  120                          5 120 1.71 120 0.25 100 1.02 46 0.13 5 0.80 5 1.40 21 1.57 2 3.00
SWEDEN 102                          3.5 102 0.89 102 0.16 101 2.01 62 0.53 58 1.39 56 2.32 25 1.48 40 2.80
SWITZRELAND  135                          3 135 1.30 135 0.45 135 1.10 60 0.78 59 1.42 59 1.86 21 1.85 8 2.02
UK  787                          5 787 2.98 787 1.59 785 1.05 780 0.35 776 1.20 770 1.34 457 1.88 357 3.29
USA  1187                          3 1187 3.94 1187 2.66 1160 1.82 1187 0.97 1187 1.73 1179 2.01 792 1.75 1170 1.31
                             
Total obs. 5857                   5857  5857  5629  5107  4935  3509  3028  3399
Average                   3.48  2.25   1.04  1.41   0.46  1.19  1.85  1.76  1.75
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Table 1.B: INCIDENCE OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PROVISIONS FOR EACH INDICATOR 
 
 
This table shows the composition of each corporate governance indicator and the percentage of 
incidence of each provision. The percentages are computed over the total company-year observations 
of each indicator. 
 
 
INDEX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROVISIONS 
     
COMM1 Nomination committee 
Compensation 
committee 
Audit 
committee 
Governance 
committee 
     
 52% 58% 83% 31% 
     
     
COMM2 
Independent 
nomination 
committee 
Independent 
compensation 
committee 
Independent 
audit 
committee 
 
     
 26% 37% 40%  
     
     
BEBCHUK 
Annually 
elected 
board 
No poison 
pills in place 
No 
supermajority 
for charters/ 
bylaws 
No 
supermajority 
for merger 
 30% 80% 10% 20% 
     
     
INDEP2 
Majority of 
independent 
board 
members 
No former 
CEO on the 
board 
Separated 
CEO/ 
Chairman 
 
 46% 73% 48%  
     
     
TRANSP Auditor ratified 
No consulting 
fees to 
auditors 
CEO not 
having 
related party 
transactions 
 
 58% 38% 91%  
     
     
COMP 
Option 
repricing 
prohibited 
Shareholders 
approve stock 
plans 
Options are 
expensed 
Option Burn 
rate in line 
with the peers 
 40% 89% 21% 36% 
 
TABLE 1.C: PERCENTAGES OF CO-EXISTENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES FOR THE MAIN INDICATORS 
 
 
This table shows the distribution of the company- year observations in the combination of specific corporate governance indicators. For instance, in 378 cases out of 5857 (6.45%), 
companies have COMM1=0 and LLSV less than 3. Similarly, in 12 cases out of 5639 (0.21%) total non-missing company-year observations for which we have data for both 
BEBCHUK and LLSV, companies have BEBCHUK=0 and LLSV less than 3, and so forth. The sum of all percentages in each matrix is 100%. Differences in the sum by columns 
and rows within the same indicator are due to different total company-year observations. 
 
 
 
 
        LLSV BEBCHUK  INDEP1  
    < 3 = 3 = 3.5/ 4 > 4 total    = 0 = 1 = 2 = 3 = 4 total     = 1 = 0 total  
                           
COMM1 = 0  6.45%             2.99% 3.76% 1.31% 15.51% 0.87% 8.79% 3.48% 0.14% 0.00% 13.29% 0.80% 2.90% 3.70% 
                          
COMM1 =1  1.28%             0.41% 23.99% 1.71% 27.39% 0.21% 18.07% 9.58% 0.16% 0.02% 28.03% 0.98% 29.27% 30.25% 
                          
COMM1 = 2  0.89%             1.23% 1.91% 1.35% 5.38% 0.27% 3.39% 1.55% 0.30% 0.09% 5.60% 2.35% 3.75% 6.10% 
                          
COMM1 = 3  1.02%             3.48% 4.22% 14.22% 22.94% 0.62% 19.06% 2.58% 0.41% 0.07% 22.74% 10.97% 15.09% 26.06% 
                          
COMM1 = 4  0.22%            20.23% 7.84% 1.31% 29.60% 4.12% 9.34% 8.33% 5.99% 2.56% 30.34% 31.11% 2.74% 33.85% 
                      
total 9.86%              28.34% 41.72% 19.90% 100.00% 6.09% 58.65% 25.52% 7.00% 2.74% 100.00% 46.21% 53.75% 100%
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TABLE 1.C: PERCENTAGES OF CO-EXISTENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES FOR THE MAIN INDICATORS 
BEBCHUK = 0  0.21% 5.76% 0.07% 0.05% 6.09%  4.98% 0.89% 5.87% 
                        
BEBCHUK = 1  7.67%          10.93% 24.43% 15.63% 58.66%  19.88% 36.77% 56.65% 
                        
BEBCHUK = 2  1.30%           4.96% 16.68% 2.58% 25.51%  11.71% 14.83% 26.54% 
                        
BEBCHUK = 3  0.09%           4.46% 2.06% 0.39% 7.00%  6.78% 1.05% 7.83% 
                        
BEBCHUK = 4  0.00%           2.70% 0.04% 0.00% 2.74%  2.99% 0.12% 3.11% 
                     
total 9.27%           28.80% 43.28% 18.65% 100.00%  46.34% 53.66% 100% 
        LLSV BEBCHUK  INDEP1  
    < 3 = 3 = 3.5/ 4 > 4 total    = 0 = 1 = 2 = 3 = 4 total     = 1 = 0 total  
                           
               
              
              
    
     
INDEP1 = 1   1.33% 25.51% 12.57% 6.79% 46.21% 
                     
INDEP1 = 0                 3.76% 3.70% 32.19% 14.14% 53.79% 
                    
total 5.09%               29.21% 44.76% 20.93% 100.00%
    (cont’d)  
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TABLE 1.D: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF FINANCIAL DATA 
 
 
This table gives summary statistics of the financial data use in the analysis. Tobin’s Q and ROA 
(Return on Assets) are the performance variables. Sales (in logarithm), total assets (in logarithm), the 
ratio property-plants-equipments (PPE) to sales, 1 year growth of sales (G_S), the ratio total debt to 
total equity (D_E) and the ratio capital expenditures to sales (CAPEX_SALES) are the control 
variables. ADR is a dummy equal to 1 if a company had traded ADRs, 0 otherwise. Details on how 
each variable is constructed are given in the text.   
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Tobin' s Q 5440 1.67 1.09 0.46 14.40 
ROA 5778 0.06 0.11 -1.08 1.52 
Total Assets ($US) (thousands) 5797 10031.72 28145.73 5.80 750507 
Sales ($US) (thousands) 5797 7940.47 19246.61 0 328213 
PPE_SALES 5773 0.64 1.24 0 33.56 
G_S 5777 0.06 0.16 -0.45 0.92 
D_E 5596 1.05 1.41 0 12.97 
CAPEX_SALES 5721 0.08 0.18 0 6.19 
ADR 5857 0.19 0.39 0 1 
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TABLE 2: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE 
 
This tables reports OLS regressions of Tobin’s Q on a country level protection of minority shareholders 
(LLSV), corporate governance indicators (LLSV, COMM1, BEBCHUK, INDEP1), their interaction 
terms, and various controls (the logarithm of sales (LOG_SALES), the ratio property-plants-
equipments to sales (PPE_SALES), and a dummy equal to one if a company has traded ADRs).  
Regressions are run with 2-digit SIC code industry fixed effects, time fixed effects, and robust standard 
error clustered at country level (in parentheses). Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 
Dependent variable Tobin's Q 
        
 I II III IV V VI VI 
        
LLSV 0.093 0.120 0.076 0.224* 0.197*** 0.197* 0.328** 
 (0.077) (0.087) (0.048) (0.119) (0.061)  (0.144) 
        
COMM1 0.514***   0.484***  0.444*** 0.429*** 
 (0.129)   (0.135)  (0.105) (0.127) 
BEBCHUK  0.615***  0.449* 0.41*  0.416* 
  (0.200)  (0.237) (0.207)  (0.219) 
INDEP1   1.937***  1.848*** 1.002*** 0.973*** 
   (0.432)  (0.438) (0.257) (0.265) 
        
COMM1* LLSV -0.098***   -0.091**  -0.089*** -0.087** 
 (0.032)   (0.035)  (0.030) (0.037) 
BEBCHUK * LLSV  -0.148**  -0.118 -0.107  -0.111 
  (0.064)  (0.075) (0.065)  (0.069) 
INDEP1 * LLSV   -0.395***  -0.374*** -0.207*** -0.198*** 
   (0.096)  (0.097) (0.066) (0.067) 
        
LOG_SALES -0.146*** -0.097** -0.146*** -0.151*** -0.155*** -0.162*** -0.169*** 
 (0.020) (0.038) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.162) (0.019) 
PPE_SALES -0.078*** 
-
0.065*** -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.071*** -0.076*** -0.072*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) 
ADR 0.159** 0.031 0.133 0.184** 0.159* 0.178** 0.200*** 
 (0.069) (0.150) (0.085) (0.063) (0.080) (0.070) (0.071) 
        
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 5416 5226 4724 5226  4591  4724 4591 
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.20 0.16 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 
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TABLE 3: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE 
 - ROBUSTNESS CHECKS -  
 
 
This tables reports OLS regressions of Tobin’s Q on country level protection of minority shareholders (LLSV or 
LEGAL), corporate governance indicators (LLSV, COMM1, BEBCHUK, INDEP1), their interaction terms, and 
various controls (the logarithm of sales (LOG_SALES), the ratio property-plants-equipments to sales  
(PPE_SALES), a dummy equal to one if a company has traded ADRs).  The variable LEGAL is the product of the 
LLSV index and the ex-post private control of self dealing as defined in Djankov et al (2006). All the regressions 
are run with 2-digit SIC code industry fixed effects and time fixed effects. Regression (I) includes financial 
companies. Regression (II) excludes high tech companies. Regressions (III) and (IV) are run with continents fixed 
effects (Asia, Europe, America) in addition to industry and time fixed effects. Regression (V) is run with the ratio 
capital expenditures to sales (CAPEX_SALES), 1 year growth of sales (GS), and the ratio debt over equity (D_E) 
as additional control variables. Robust standard errors clustered at country level are in parentheses. Significance 
levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Dependent variable Tobin's Q 
  
 I  II  III  IV  V 
          
LLSV 0.302**  0.304*  0.376***    0.270* 
 (0.120)  (0.153)  (0.129)    (0.139) 
LEGAL       0.314**   
       (0.131)   
          
COMM1 0.383***  0.458***  0.429**  0.313***  0.370*** 
 (0.104)  (0.158)  (0.170)  (0.109)  (0.110) 
BEBCHUK 0.434**  0.297  0.426*  0.303  0.392* 
 (0.165)  (0.244)  (0.21)  (0.191)  (0.207) 
INDEP1 0.850***  0.728***  0.788**  0.414**  0.822*** 
 (0.223)  (0.224)  (0.31)  (0.191)  (0.268) 
          
COMM1*LLSV -0.074**  -0.094**  -0.100**  -0.089**  -0.073** 
 (0.030)  (0.046)  (0.044)  (0.034)  (0.033) 
BEBCHUK*LLSV -0.118**  -0.081  -0.117  -0.090  -0.105 
 (0.052)  (0.076)  (0.068)  (0.063)  (0.065) 
INDEP1*LLSV -0.175***  -0.133**  -0.163**  -0.087*  -0.165** 
 (0.053)  (0.055)  (0.078)  (0.51)  (0.068) 
          
LOG_SALES -0.153***  -0.149***  -0.167***  -0.160***  -0.128*** 
 (0.014)  (0.027)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.017) 
PPE_SALES -0.047***  -0.064***  -0.071***  -0.070***  -0.074*** 
 (0.005)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.021) 
ADR 0.164**  0.178**  0.225***  0.206***  0.169** 
 (0.061)  (0.072)  (0.058)  (0.063)  (0.060) 
CAPEX_SALES         0.193 
         (0.173) 
G_S         0.987*** 
         (0.242) 
D_E         -0.017 
         (0.012) 
          
Year fixed effects Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Industry fixed effects Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Continents fixed effects N  N  Y  Y  N 
Obs. 5383  3807  4591  4591  4333 
Number of countries 23  23  23  23  23 
R-squared 0.24  0.24  0.22  0.22  0.24 
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TABLE 4: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE 
- BOARD INDEPENDENCE, TRANSPARENCY AND COMPENSATION - 
 
This tables reports OLS regressions of Tobin’s Q on a country level protection of minority shareholders 
(LLSV), corporate governance indicators (LLSV, COMM1, BEBCHUK, INDEP1, INDEP2, INDEP3, 
TRANSP, COMP), their interaction terms, and various controls (the logarithm of sales (LOG_SALES), 
the ratio property-plants-equipments to sales (PPE_SALES), and a dummy equal to one if a company 
has traded ADRs). INDEP_n*LLSV is the interaction term between INDEP_n and LLSV, where 
n=1,2,3. Regressions are run with 2-digit SIC code industry fixed effects, time fixed effects, and robust 
standard error clustered at country level (in parentheses). Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and 
*** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Dependent variable    Tobin's Q 
     
 I II III IV 
     
LLSV 0.475*** 0.454*** 0.512** 0.255 
 (0.158) (0.146) (0.232) (0.244) 
     
COMM1 0.803 0.680*** 0.478** 0.514** 
 (0.170) (0.124) (0.177) (0.191) 
BEBCHUK 0.399* 0.449** 0.209 0.453** 
 (0.210) (0.185) (0.154) (0.209) 
INDEP1   1.128*** 1.077*** 
   (0.252) (0.358) 
INDEP2 0.074    
 (0.144)    
INDEP3  0.084   
  (0.164)   
TRANSP   0.446  
   (0.366)  
COMP    -0.153 
    (0.122) 
     
COMM1*LLSV -0.176*** -0.157*** -0.099* -0.116* 
 (0.044) (0.033) (0.056) (0.061) 
BEBCHUK*LLSV -0.106 -0.118 -0.045 -0.128* 
 (0.066) (0.060) (0.051) (0.067) 
INDEP_n*LLSV -0.005 -0.023 -0.217*** -0.190** 
 (0.036) (0.039) (0.060) (0.082) 
TRANSP*LLSV   -0.126  
   (0.101)  
COMP*LLSV    0.048 
    (0.027) 
     
LOG_SALES -0.161*** -0.164*** -0.202*** -0.206*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.033) (0.037) 
PPE_SALES -0.077*** -0.075*** -0.079*** -0.074*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.023) 
ADR 0.182** 0.144 0.235** 0.243*** 
 (0.072) (0.107) (0.084) (0.072) 
     
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 4479 3074 2671 3036 
Number of countries 23 23 22 21 
R-squared 0.22 0.21 0.25 0.26 
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TABLE 5: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE 
- COMMITTEES -  
 
This tables reports OLS regressions of Tobin’s Q on a country level protection of minority shareholders 
(LLSV), corporate governance indicators (LLSV, COMM1, COMM2, BEBCHUK), their interaction 
terms, and various controls (the logarithm of sales (LOG_SALES), the ratio property-plants-
equipments to sales (PPE_SALES), and a dummy equal to one if a company has traded ADRs).  
Regressions are run with 2-digit SIC code industry fixed effects, time fixed effects, and robust standard 
error clustered at country level (in parentheses). Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 
Dependent variable Tobin's Q 
     
 I II III IV 
     
LLSV 0.093 0.050 0.224* 0.152** 
 (0.077) (0.044) (0.119) (0.064) 
     
COMM1 0.514***  0.484***  
 (0.129)  (0.135)  
COMM2  0.710***  0.677*** 
  (0.076)  (0.080) 
BEBCHUK   0.449* 0.343* 
   (0.237) (0.187) 
     
COMM1*LLSV -0.098***  -0.091**  
 (0.032)  (0.035)  
COMM2*LLSV  -0.141***  -0.134*** 
  (0.021)  (0.021) 
BEBCHUK*LLSV   -0.118 -0.089 
   (0.075) (0.057) 
     
LOG_SALES -0.146*** -0.139*** -0.151*** -0.144*** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) 
PPE_SALES -0.078*** -0.078*** -0.074*** -0.074*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
ADR 0.159** 0.191*** 0.184** 0.215*** 
 (0.069) (0.060) (0.063) (0.059) 
     
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 5416 5416 5226 5226 
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 
TABLE 6: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, EXTERNAL FINANCING DEPENDENCE AND PERFORMANCE 
 
This tables reports OLS regressions of Tobin’s Q on the interaction term between external financing dependence and corporate governance indicators (COMM1, COMM2, 
BEBCHUK, INDEP1, INDEP2, INDEP3, TRANSP, COMP), and the logarithm of sales (LOG_SALES) as control variable. External dependence is the Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
measure of financial dependence at industrial level for U.S. companies and updated for the year 2000. Regressions are run with 2-digit SIC code industry fixed effects, time fixed 
effects, country fixed effects, and robust standard error clustered at industry level (in parentheses). Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
Dependent variable             Tobin’s Q 
             
            I II III IV V VI VII VIII
             
Interaction (external dependence X COMM1) 0.027***        
     (0.008)        
Interaction (external dependence X COMM2)         0.031**
             (0.013)
Interaction (external dependence X BEBCHUK)         0.010
             (0.023)
Interaction (external dependence X INDEP1)         0.109***
             (0.035)
Interaction (external dependence X INDEP2)         0.050**
             (0.009)
Interaction (external dependence X INDEP3)         -0.019
             (0.026)
Interaction (external dependence XTRANSP)         -0.028
             (0.022)
Interaction (external dependence X COMP)         -0.017
             (0.035)
             
LOG_SALES             -0.085*** -0.083*** -0.081*** -0.103*** -0.094*** -0.099*** -0.104*** -0.095***
          (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.026) (0.020) (0.016)
             
Year fixed effects            Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry fixed effects            Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country fixed effects            Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of countries            22 22 22 22 22 22 22 20
Obs.             4400 4400 4237 3713 3585 2182 2139 2181
R-squared             0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.23 0.22
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TABLE 7: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, EXTERNAL FINANCING DEPENDENCE AND PERFORMANCE 
 
This tables reports OLS regressions of Tobin’s Q on the interaction term between external financing dependence and corporate governance indicators (COMM1, COMM2, INDEP1, 
INDEP2), and various control variables (the logarithm of sales (LOG_SALES), the ratio property-plants-equipments to sales (PPE_SALES), a dummy equal to one if a company has 
traded ADRs, and the LLSV index of shareholders protection). External dependence is the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure of financial dependence at industrial level for U.S. 
companies and updated for the year 2000. Regressions are run with 2-digit SIC code industry fixed effects, time fixed effects, country fixed effects, and robust standard error clustered 
at industry level (in parentheses). Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Dependent variable    Tobin’s Q 
              
             I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
              
Interaction (external dependence X COMM1) 0.026*** 0.030***        0.0122 0.019***
            (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
Interaction (external dependence X COMM2)          0.029** 0.038***
             (0.013) (0.012)
Interaction (external dependence X INDEP1)          0.104*** 0.152*** 0.088*
              (0.038) (0.043) (0.046)
Interaction (external dependence X INDEP2)         0.049*** 0.080*** 0.036***
             (0.010) (0.018) (0.011)
              
              
LOG_SALES              -0.116*** -0.125*** -0.115*** -0.123*** -0.135*** -0.139*** -0.125*** -0.131*** -0.136*** -0.126***
              (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018)
PPE_SALES              -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.062*** -0.067*** -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.067***
              (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023)
ADR              0.191*** 0.207*** 0.193*** 0.020*** 0.186*** 0.220*** 0.174*** 0.214*** 0.185*** 0.171***
              (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.046) (0.055) (0.049) (0.051) (0.054)
LLSV              0.037 0.041 0.043 0.034
              (0.031) (0.031) (0.035) (0.037)
              
Year fixed effects             Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry fixed effects             Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country fixed effects             Y N Y N Y N Y N Y Y
Number of countries             22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Obs.              4399 4399 4399 4399 3712 3712 3584 3584 3712 3584
R-squared           0.20 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.20
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TABLE 8: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, EXTERNAL FINANCING DEPENDENCE AND PERFORMANCE 
- CROSS SECTION REGRESSION 2004-to-2005 - 
 
 
This tables reports OLS regressions of 2-year average 2004-to-2005 Tobin’s Q on the interaction term between external financing dependence and corporate governance indicators 
(COMM1, COMM2, INDEP1, INDEP2), and the logarithm of sales (LOG_SALES) as the control variable. External dependence is the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure of 
financial dependence at industrial level for U.S. companies and updated for the year 2000. Regressions are run with 2-digit SIC code industry fixed effects, country fixed effects, and 
White heteroscedastic robust standard error (in parentheses). Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
Dependent variable 2 years average Tobin's Q (2004-to-2005) 
        
        I II III IV
        
Interaction (external dependence X COMM1) 0.030*    
    (0.017)    
Interaction (external dependence X COMM2)  0.054**   
        (0.024)
Interaction (external dependence X INDEP1)   0.14***  
        (0.047)
Interaction (external dependence X INDEP2)    0.049* 
        (0.030)
        
        
LOG_SALES        -0.081*** -0.080*** -0.095*** -0.091***
     (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
        
Industry fixed effects   Y Y Y Y 
Country fixed effects   Y Y Y Y 
Number of countries   22 22 22 22 
Obs.        1516 1516 1423 1377
R-squared        0.18 0.19 0.20 0.20
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TABLE 9: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, EXTERNAL FINANCING DEPENDENCE, SIZE AND PERFORMANCE 
 
This tables reports OLS regressions of Tobin’s Q on the interaction term between external financing dependence and corporate governance indicators (COMM1, COMM2, INDEP1, 
INDEP2), and the interaction term between external finance dependence and the average firm size with respect to  the industry (large firm share). External dependence is the Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) measure of financial dependence at industrial level for U.S. companies and updated for the year 2000. Large firm share is the Beck et al. (2005) industry k’s share 
of employment in firms with more than 20 employees in the U.S. for the year 2000. The logarithm of sales (LOG_SALES) is used as control variable. Regressions are run with 2-digit 
SIC code industry fixed effects, country fixed effects, and robust standard error clustered at industry level (in parentheses). Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable    Tobin’s Q 
            
           I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
            
Interaction (external dependence X COMM1)         0.016**
            (0.006)
Interaction (large firm share X COMM1)        0.068** 0.054*
           (0.030) (0.031)
Interaction (external dependence X COMM2)         0.019*
            (0.010)
Interaction (large firm share X COMM2)   0.056* 0.040     
           (0.032) (0.033)
Interaction (external dependence X INDEP1)         0.089***
            (0.030)
Interaction (large firm share X INDEP1)     0.14** 0.069   
           (0.064) (0.058)
Interaction (external dependence X INDEP2)         0.046***
            (0.012)
Interaction (large firm share X INDEP2)       0.051 0.012 
           (0.034) (0.039)
            
LOG_SALES            -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.103*** -0.104*** -0.034*** -0.094***
            (0.021) (0.089) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.058) (0.019) (0.018)
            
Year fixed effects           Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry fixed effects           Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country fixed effects           Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of countries           22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Obs.            4403 4396 4403 4396 3713 3709 3585 3581
R-squared         0.19  0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
 
